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Obscenity
Gerald M. Rosbergt
"There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book,"
Oscar Wilde said. "Books are well written or badly written. That
is all."1 On the other hand, Wilde also said that he could resist
everything except temptation,2 and he wound up serving two
years at hard labor on a charge of gross indecency. Not surpris-
ingly, his views on the morality of books have turned out to be
an imperfect guide to what real judges are likely to do when real
cases come before them.
For decades the Supreme Court has struggled with what
Justice Harlan called the intractable problem of obscenity.8 On
t Partner, Washington, D.C. office of Dewey Ballantine. B.A. 1968, Harvard Univer-
sity;, J.D. 1971, Harvard University. Mr. Rosberg was formerly a professor of law at the
University of Michigan, and in 1980-81 served as Counselor on International Law at the
U.S. Department of State. Mr. Rosberg was one of Justice Brennan's law clerks in the
1972 term.
1. 0. WMDE, THE PORTRAIT OF DoRAN GRAY, preface (1891).
2. 0. WADE, LADY WINDERMFM'S FAN Act I (1891).
3. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (separate opin-
ion of Harlan, J.).
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the occasion of this tribute to Justice Brennan, I want to briefly
comment on the Justice's extraordinary contributions to the law
in this area.
I do not come as an advocate for his views; his opinions
speak eloquently for themselves. Nor do I propose to offer some
new way of looking at the problem of obscenity that will finally
let us readily distinguish works protected by the first amend-
ment from those the state and federal governments may sup-
press. There is an immense and often distinguished body of
literature on the law of obscenity," and I happily leave to the
first amendment scholars the burden of further doctrinal analy-
sis and development.
My interest in the area is traceable to the Supreme Court's
1972 Term, when I had the great privilege of clerking for Justice
Brennan. For the law of obscenity, and particularly for Justice
Brennan, the 1972 Term was a significant turning-point.
With all the tributes that have been paid to Justice Bren-
nan since his retirement from the Court last summer, relatively
little has been said about his work in the obscenity area. The
ABA Journal, for example, devoted 18 pages of its February
1991 issue to Justice Brennan and his legacy.5 Yet the Justice's
obscenity opinions are barely mentioned in passing.
The explanation is certainly not that the Justice had little
interest in the area. On the contrary, I believe he wrote more
opinions on obscenity issues than any other subject that came
before the Court, with the important exception of the death
penalty.' More remarkable is the frequency with which Justice
Brennan wrote on this subject as compared to his fellow Jus-
tices. By my (admittedly rough) calculation, he wrote more than
4. Among numerous examples that might be chosen, see H. KALVEN, A WORTHY
TRADITION 33-53 (1988); F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY (1976); Stone, Anti-Pornog-
raphy Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARv. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 461 (1986).
5. TRm=, Architect of the Bill of Rights, 77 A.B.A. J. 46 (1991); FEIN, LEE, CHOPER.
HOWARD AND NEUBORNE, The Brennan Legacy: A Roundtable Discussion, 77 A.BA J. 52
(1991); STEWART, A Life on the Court, 77 A.B.A. J. 62 (1991).
6. Cf. Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1125 (1991) (reporting on the
finding of one of the Justice's law clerks that the Justice wrote 2,347 dissenting opinions
over his career, 1,517 of them in death penalty cases). Many of the obscenity opinions, to
be sure, were relatively brief dissents from denial of certiorari. But the persistence with
which the Justice continued to express his views on this subject, despite his inability to
win a majority of the Court, is itself an indication of the importance he placed upon it.
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three times as many obscenity opinions as any other Justice.7
Merely counting the opinions, however, does not begin to
show Justice Brennan's impact in this area. For the first half of
his 34 years on the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan was the au-
thor of almost every major opinion for the Court on the subject
of obscenity: Roth v. United States,8 Mishkin v. New York,9
Freedman v. Maryland,0 Ginzburg v. United States,"' Ginsberg
v. New York,1 2 the plurality opinions in Jacobellis v. Ohio's and
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts,1 4 and many
more. For years almost anyone could have told you that a book
or movie was not obscene unless it was "utterly without redeem-
ing social importance." (In a song entitled "Smut", Tom Lehrer
explained the standard: "As the judge remarked the day that he
acquitted my Aunt Hortense, To be smut it must be utterly
without redeeming social importance." On the other hand, a car-
toon once showed a judge telling a defendant who stood before
him, "Just because the pages are numbered sequentially doesn't
mean your book has redeeming social importance."15 ) That
phrase and its companion, "utterly without redeeming social
value," went from Justice Brennan's opinions in Roth, Jacobellis
and Memoirs into our language and folklore.
7. Borrowing a technique used by one of the Justice's law clerks (see supra note 6),
I used Lexis to tabulate the opinions written by the Justices that have included the
words "obscene" or "obscenity." The figures are no doubt over-inclusive, because I did
not weed out the cases where a dissenting justice may have described the majority's
handling of some fourth amendment or other problem as "obscene." But I used the same
technique for all the justices, and the pertinent point is how the respective numbers
compare. The analysis showed that Justice Brennan had 191 opinions. Justices Douglas
and White were tied for second place with 62 each.
8. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
9. 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (upholding conviction under New York obscenity statute).
10. 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (Maryland motion picture censorship statute procedurally
defective because it failed to provide adequate safeguards against inhibition of protected
expression).
11. 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (upholding conviction under federal obscenity statute).
12. 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding conviction under New York statute that prohib-
ited sale to minors of sexually oriented materials that are not obscene for adults).
13. 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (setting aside conviction under Ohio law for possessing and
exhibiting an allegedly obscene film).
14. 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (setting aside finding that the book commonly known as
Fanny Hill was obscene).
15. The Supreme Court itself made this last point with somewhat more refinement:
"a quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitutionally redeem an
otherwise obscene publication." Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972).
1991]
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
How, then, to account for the apparent reluctance to focus
on the Justice's obscenity opinions? One explanation, I suspect,
is that the politics of obscenity have become more complicated
than they used to be. For many civil libertarians, the choice was
once fairly simple: you were for freedom of expression or for cen-
sorship; for James Joyce, Henry Miller and D. H. Lawrence, or
for the Legion of Decency, the Hayes Office and Charles Keat-
ing's Citizens for Decent Literature.16 But the feminist attack on
pornography has made it harder than it used to be to tell the
heroes from the villains." The confusion is nicely captured in
the controversy surrounding the performance artist Karen Fin-
ley, "whose angry scatological feminism is intended to be anti-
pornographic," 18 but who has herself been attacked for inde-
cency and lewdness. 9
A second reason why some may be reluctant to dwell on
Justice Brennan's obscenity opinions is lingering discomfort over
his opinion for the Court in Roth v. United States.20 For the
past 17 years the Justice has been the Court's champion of free
expression in the obscenity area. But his role was more ambigu-
ous during the first half of his tenure on the Court. The Roth
opinion, which he wrote in 1957 at the end of his first Term, was
the first decision of the Supreme Court to hold that "obscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press."2 Along with its early progeny (most of which he also au-
thored), Roth was subject to heavy criticism, particularly from
those otherwise most attracted to Justice Brennan's views. On
16. Once one of the nation's leading anti-pornography organizations, and an amicus
curiae in some of the Warren Court's leading obscenity cases, Citizens for Decent Litera-
ture was founded in 1957 by Charles H. Keating, Jr., who went on to greater fame as the
head of Lincoln Savings and Loan and a major figure in the savings-and-loan debacle of
the 1980's. See generally Corn, Dirty Bookkeeping: Charles Keating's Porno Library,
Thm NEw R PUBLIC, April 2, 1990, at 14.
17. See generally Wolfe, Dirt and Democracy, THE NEw REPuBLic, Feb. 19, 1990, at
27; Sunnstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589.
18. Rosen, "Miller" Time: America's Obscenity Test Lacks Serious Value, THE
N.w REPUELIc, Oct. 1, 1990, at 18.
19. For a variety of views on Ms. Finley's work, see Adler, Post-Modern Art and the
Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1367 (1990); Larson, Censor Deprivation,
NEw YORK MAGAZINE, Aug. 6, 1990, at 48; Crittenden ... But Is It Art - or Trash,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
20. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21. Id. at 485.
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the Warren Court, Justice Brennan's position on obscenity put
him to the right of Justices Black and Douglas, who condemned
any restriction on sexually oriented speech,2 Justice Stewart,23
and even, in cases involving the federal government's authority
to suppress obscenity, Justice Harlan.2 '
In 1966 Justice Brennan provided the fifth vote to uphold
the criminal conviction of Ralph Ginzburg, who was sentenced
to five years in prison for sending sexually oriented material
through the mail. 5 The decision was particularly galling to
many liberals because it held that in close cases evidence of
"pandering" could be taken into account in deciding whether
the Roth standard was satisfied. 6
In 1969 Justice Brennan was unwilling to join the opinion of
the Court in Stanley v. Georgia."7 There, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Marshall, the Court ruled that the first amendment barred a
state from imposing criminal penalties on the mere private pos-
session of sexually oriented materials, even if those materials
could be considered obscene.2 8 Justice Brennan joined Justice
Stewart's opinion concurring in the result on fourth amendment
search-and-seizure grounds rather than in reliance on the first
amendment.2 9
As late as 1971, in United States v. 37 Photo-graphs,30 Jus-
tice Brennan joined Chief Justice Burger and Justices White
and Blackmun in a narrow reading of Stanley that would limit
its reach to the privacy of the home. At issue was the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute barring the importation of obscene
materials. The plurality, which included Justice Brennan, main-
tained that the government could seize obscene material from
22. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 482 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Id. at 497 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (government may suppress only
"hard-core" pornography).
24. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 708 (separate
opinion of Harlan, J.) (federal government may suppress only "hard-core" pornography,
states have much wider authority and discretion).
25. Ginsberg, 383 U.S. at 463.
26. As the Court put it, the "leer of the sensualist" permeated the advertising
materials that Ginzburg had sent through the mails. Id. at 468.
27. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
28. Id. at 559.
29. Id. at 569 (Stewart, J., concurring).
30. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
1991]
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travelers at a port of entry, even if the material was intended
solely for private use."l In the companion case of United States
v. Reidel,32 Justice Brennan voted with the majority to reverse a
decision that had relied on Stanley as the basis for striking
down the federal statute prohibiting the knowing use of the
mails for the distribution of obscene materials."3 Considering
where Justice Brennan wound up just two years later, it is star-
tling to recall how uncomfortable he originally was with the
Stanley decision and its implications.
Of course, the picture of Justice Brennan as a heavy on the
subject of obscenity was always overdone. Roth is important at
least as much for what it protected as for what it permitted the
state and federal governments to suppress. Roth said that "sex
and obscenity are not synonymous" and that "[t]he portrayal of
sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself suffi-
cient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech and press."' " Those propositions may not
seem remarkable now, but the Supreme Court had never before
said as much. The Court also rejected the obscenity standard set
out in Regina v. Hicklin,8 followed by some American courts,
which judged works by the effect of isolated excerpts on particu-
larly sensitive persons.3 That test, the Court explained in Roth,
"might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex,
and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the
31. Id. at 396. Justices Black, Douglas and Marshall viewed Stanley as controlling
at the port of entry as well as in the home. Justices Harlan and Stewart found it unnec-
essary to decide the question, but Justice Stewart noted that if Stanley did not apply to
the bringing of a book into the United States for private reading, then he did not know
what the decision meant. Id. at 379 (Stewart, J., concurring). Two years later, a majority
of the Court held that importation for private use was not covered by Stanley. See
United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973). By that
time, Justice Brennan was in dissent.
32. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
33. Id. The court below had held the statute unconstitutional as applied to the dis-
tribution of obscene material to willing adult recipients on the grounds that "if a person
has the right [under Stanley] to receive and possess the material, then someone must
have the right to deliver it to him." Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
34. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
35. 1868 L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
36. On the origins of American obscenity law and the adoption of the Hicklin stan-
dard, see F. ScHAuER, supra note 4, at 1-40.
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freedoms of speech and press. '3 7 The proper test, Justice Bren-
nan explained, was "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."38
During this same period Justice Brennan authored opinions
for the Court that established important procedural safeguards
in obscenity cases, including Marcus v. Search Warrant9 and
Freedman v. Maryland."' And writing for a plurality in Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure,'1 he refined the Roth standard to make
clear that a state cannot proscribe a book, even if it appeals to a
prurient interest in sex and is patently offensive, unless it is also
shown to be utterly without redeeming social value.42
For most of the first half of his tenure on the Court, Justice
Brennan's position on obscenity put him at or near the Court's
center. Jacobellis v. Ohio," decided in 1964, illustrates the point
(though it is admittedly better known as the case where Justice
Stewart declared that even though he could not define obscen-
ity, he knew it when he saw it"). Justice Brennan voted with a
majority of six to reverse a state court finding that a French
film, "Les Amants" ("The Lovers"), was obscene. He wrote only
for himself and Justice Goldberg, however, because he was un-
willing to join the more permissive analysis of Justices Black,
Douglas and Stewart.'3 Justice Brennan's conclusion that the
film was not obscene seems unremarkable by today's stan-
dards,' but to reach that result he had to take the (for him)
very unusual step of disagreeing with Chief Justice Warren. The
37. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89.
38. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
39. 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (procedures for seizing allegedly obscene materials not con-
stitutionally adequate because of danger of infringing on protected speech).
40. 380 U.S. 51 (1965), described by Professor Schauer as the Court's "landmark
ruling in the licensing and prior-restraint areas." F. SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 231.
41. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
42. Id.
43. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
44. Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 187.
46. As Justice Brennan described it, the film involved "a woman bored with her life
and marriage who abandons her husband and family for a young archaeologist with
whom she suddenly falls in love." Id. at 195-96. It included "an explicit love scene in the
last reel of the film." Id. at 196. The film was "rated by at least two critics of national
stature among the best films of the year." Id.
1991]
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Chief Justice and two other Justices, Clark and Harlan, would
have upheld the state court's finding of obscenity.
Jacobellis illustrates another important point: the fractiona-
tion of the Warren Court on the definition of obscenity. In Jus-
tice Harlan's words, the subject had generated "a variety of
views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other
course of constitutional adjudication," leaving anyone who read
the Court's decisions in a condition of "utter bewilderment. '4 7
For 16 years after Roth the Court was not once able to reach a
majority in any case dealing with the definition of obscenity. Be-
ginning in 1967, it adopted the practice of summarily reversing
judgments whenever at least five justices, applying differing
standards, agreed that the work was not obscene s.4 The Court
disposed of at least 31 cases in this manner,4 but its inability to
offer a rationale for the decisions left the state and lower federal
courts in total confusion about the standards they were sup-
posed to apply.
By the 1972 Term, with the law of obscenity in chaos, Jus-
tice Brennan was prepared to abandon his own decision in Roth.
Commenting on 16 years of effort on the obscenity problem, the
Justice told an interviewer:
I tried and I tried, and I waffled back and forth, and I finally gave
up. If you can't define it, you can't prosecute people for it. And
that's why, in the Paris Adult Theater decision, I finally aban-
doned the whole effort. I reached the conclusion that every crimi-
nal-obscenity statute .. .was necessarily unconstitutional, be-
cause it was impossible, from the statute, to define obscenity.50
The approach Justice Brennan urged unsuccessfully on the
Court, as set out in the dissenting opinion he wrote in Paris
Adult Theater I v. Slaton,1 was as follows:
First, the Court should continue to reject the absolutist po-
sition of Justices Black and Douglas. He would not agree, in
other words, that the state and federal governments are wholly
47. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05, 707 (separate
opinion of Harlan, J.).
48. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
49. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82-83 & n.8 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
50. Hentoff, The Constitutionalist, THE NEW YoRxER, March 12, 1990, at 56.
51. 413 U.S. 49, 70 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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without power to suppress sexually oriented expression.
Second, the Court should also reject Roth and acknowledge
that it had proved impossible to define obscenity with sufficient
precision to pass constitutional standards.5 2 The vagueness of
the definition, he argued, deprived citizens of fair notice of what
the law proscribed, threatened to chill constitutionally protected
expression, and imposed significant institutional harms on the
Supreme Court and the rest of the judiciary. These harms in-
cluded the crowding of the Supreme Court's docket with obscen-
ity cases, which subjected the justices to the "absurd business of
perusing and viewing the miserable stuff that pours into the
Court.""3 The impossibility of defining obscenity with precision
also created tensions between state and federal courts because it
left the impression that the justices were merely second-guessing
state court judges.
Third, to resolve the problems of fair notice, chilling effect
and institutional harms, the Court should hold that in the ab-
sence of distribution to juveniles or offensive exposure to uncon-
senting adults, the first amendment prohibits the state and fed-
eral governments from suppressing sexually oriented speech,
even if that speech might in some sense be considered obscene."'
52. The Justice's dissenting opinion in Paris Adult Theater did not expressly reject
Roth's two-level analysis - i.e., its premise that obscene speech is different from ordi-
nary speech and is wholly unprotected by the first amendment. Instead, it reasoned that
the Court erred in Roth insofar as it found that the class of unprotected obscene expres-
sion (assuming it exists) could be defined with sufficient precision to permit its suppres-
sion. See, e.g., Id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a footnote, however, Justice Bren-
nan cast significant doubt on the continued validity in his mind of Roth's premise that
there exists a separate class of obscene expression that falls outside the protection of the
first amendment. Id. at 85-86 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (separate opinion of
Harlan, J.).
54. Justice Brennan discounted - but not to zero - the governmental interest in
"regulating the reading and viewing habits of consenting adults." Paris Adult Theater,
413 U.S. at 107 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Relying on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
566 (state "cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a
person's private thoughts"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state abortion law uncon-
stitutional), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) ("the State may do
much ... to improve the quality of its citizens .... but the individual has certain fun-
damental rights which must be respected"), he concluded that the governmental interest,
though not "trivial or nonexistent," could not justify the harms resulting from attempts
to bar the distribution of obscene materials to consenting adults. Paris Adult Theater,
413 U.S. at 112.
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In other words, so long as distribution was limited to consenting
adults, the courts would not have to decide whether the work
was obscene because the work could not be suppressed even if it
was.
Fourth, while acknowledging the seriousness of the govern-
mental interest in protecting juveniles and unconsenting adults,
the Court should reserve decision on whether and under what
circumstances governments could regulate or even suppress sex-
ually oriented speech to serve this interest.5 5
Justice Brennan's approach won the support of Justice Mar-
shall, whose opinion in Stanley v. Georgia anticipated the Jus-
tice's analysis, although it stopped well short of it.5 He also had
the support of Justice Stewart. While Justice Douglas would ad-
here to his own views, he would provide a fourth vote to over-
turn obscenity convictions in all cases involving consenting
adults. But Justice Brennan could not obtain a fifth vote.5 7
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, and by a vote of 5-4,
the Court in Miller v. California reaffirmed Roth and the princi-
ple that obscene speech enjoys no protection under the first
55. Even where the allegedly obscene work was distributed to juveniles or uncon-
senting adults, the overbreadth doctrine would generally require invalidation of the ob-
scenity statute on its face and without the need for an evaluation of the work itself,
because most state and federal obscenity statutes were not narrowly focused on protect-
ing juveniles and unconsenting adults. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing 'attacks on overbroad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could
not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.'" (quoting
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972))).
56. Acknowledging that he had not joined the opinion of the Court in Stanley, Jus-
tice Brennan said in Paris Adult Theater that he was now "inclined to agree" with Stan-
ley's reasoning. Paris Adult Theater, 413 U.S. at 85 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. At several moments in the 1960's Justice Brennan's abandonment of Roth might
well have produced a five-person majority for a considerably more permissive standard.
Why the Justice resisted the move for as long as he did remains an open question. Chief
Justice Warren, who was the Justice's closest ally on the Court, was a former prosecutor,
and his position on obscenity issues was, as Jacobellis showed, somewhat more stringent
than Justice Brennan's. It is tempting to suggest that the Justice was reluctant, for as
long as Chief Justice Warren remained on the Court, to separate himself any further
from the Chief Justice than he already had in Jacobellis. But that explanation does not
account for the Justice's position in United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363
(1971), and United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), which were decided after Chief
Justice Warren retired.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/1
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amendment.58 The Court also modified the definition of obscen-
ity in the hope of making it easier for prosecutors to convict.
Instead of having to prove that a work was utterly without re-
deeming social value, the prosecution would only have to show
that it lacked "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. '" The Court also authorized juries to apply local rather
than national standards in considering whether a work was pa-
tently offensive. As the Chief Justice explained, "the people of
Maine or Mississippi [would no longer have to] accept public de-
piction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York
City."60 Miller did indicate, however, that a work could not be
proscribed unless it depicted or described "hard-core" sexual
conduct specifically defined by the regulating state or federal
law." The Court offered several examples of the type of sexual
conduct it had in mind. e2
In the companion case of Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,3
where Chief Justice Burger again wrote for the majority, the
Court "categorically disapprove[d]" Justice Brennan's "con-
senting adults" rationale." If a movie was found to meet the
definition of obscenity, the states could punish those who
showed it, even if only to consenting adults.
In the years after Miller v. California and Paris Adult The-
ater, Justice Brennan steadfastly adhered to the views he ex-
pressed there, dissenting from the Court's denial of certiorari in
dozens of cases involving obscenity convictions obtained under
statutes that he considered constitutionally overbroad and inva-
lid on their face.
Did Justice Brennan have the better of the argument? From
a doctrinal standpoint, his position has enjoyed substantial
scholarly support. Professor Kalven observed that "[flor the mo-
ment, the hard-won clarity of Justice Brennan's view is confined
to dissent."" And he expressed disappointment that "a bare ma-
58. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
59. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 32.
61. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-27.
62. Id. at 25.
63. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
64. Id. at 57.
65. H. KALVEN, supra note 4, at 53.
1991] . 465
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jority of five justices continues to resist the conclusion that even
the narrowest concession to censorship cannot be justified in the
case of consenting adults, in view of the cost of regulation and
the absence of any compelling state interest in policing the sex-
ual fantasies of adults." 66 As Justice Stevens noted, even the
1986 Final Report of the Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography, which was otherwise unsympathetic to Justice
Brennan's position, acknowledged that "'the bulk of scholarly
commentary is of the opinion that the Supreme Court's resolu-
tion of and basic approach to the First Amendment issues' in-
volved in obscenity laws 'is incorrect,' in that it fails to ade-
quately protect First Amendment values."6 7
It may well be argued, however, that the critical question
was empirical, not doctrinal." To a very large extent Justice
Brennan's argument turned on a prediction of what would hap-
pen, or not happen, if the Court persevered in the attempt to
divide sexually oriented expression into two categories, one pro-
tected by the Constitution and the other subject to suppression
by state or federal governments. As Justice Brennan saw it, the
Court faced the following dilemma so long as it adhered to Roth:
It could continue to bear the burden of reviewing the record in
scores of obscenity cases to decide whether the work at issue was
obscene, but that would perpetuate the problems of vagueness
and institutional stress to which Roth had given rise. Alterna-
tively, it could give up its oversight role and leave communities
much greater latitude to find works obscene on the basis of local
standards. That approach would purchase some relief for the
Court, but at the price of a potentially drastic curtailment of
protected speech. The only escape from this dilemma, he rea-
soned, was for the courts to let adults decide for themselves
what movies to see and what books or magazines to read.
The early returns seemed to confirm that the dilemma
would prove just as unmanageable as Justice Brennan had
feared. In Jenkins v. Georgia,69 decided just one year after
66. Id.
67. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 513 n.7 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report 261 (July 1986)).
68. See Riggs, Miller v. California Revisited: An Empirical Note, 1981 BRmGHAM
YOUNG U.L. Rav. 247, 251-22.
69. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
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Miller, the Court overturned a Georgia decision holding that the
movie Carnal Knowledge, starring Ann Margret and Jack Nich-
olson, was obscene. 0 Justice Brennan concurred in the result.
The lesson seemed obvious: the state courts could not apply the
new Miller standards in a way that safeguarded constitutionally
protected expression, and, as Justice Brennan had predicted, no
one could say with certainty that a work was obscene "until at
least five members of [the Supreme] Court, applying inevitably
obscure standards, have pronounced it so.""
In fact, Jenkins proved the exception rather than the rule.
The Court has had no shortage of subsequent obscenity cases
deciding an average of considerably more than one every year
since Miller. The great majority of these cases, however, have
concerned either the power of states to regulate the distribution
of sexually oriented materials - for example, through zoning
ordinances directed at the location of adult movie thea-
ters, 2 - or a host of thorny questions raised by the creation,
distribution and possession of child pornography.73 The Court
has largely avoided the unsavory task of deciding which movies,
videotapes or glossy pictures are obscene and which are not.
Of course, the Court may simply have dumped the problem
on the state and lower federal courts by refusing to grant certio-
rari in cases where the obscenity of particular works was put in
issue. There is obviously some evidence for that view, including
Justice Brennan's numerous dissents from denial of certiorari.
There is also evidence suggesting that the Miller reformulation
has failed to cure the vagueness that Justice Brennan considered
inherent in any attempt to articulate a definition of obscenity. 7'
70. Id.
71. Id. at 164-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
73. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491
U.S. 576 (1989).
74. Justice Brennan, in his dissent from denial of certiorari in Liles v. Oregon, 425
U.S. 963 (1976), quoted from the obscenity standard as applied by the trial judge:
Well, what is patently offensive?
And frankly, I had to kind of apply my own standard, which, I believe, corre-
sponds with the standards of the community. And the standard probably, simply
stated and boiled down, is the same one that was taught to me by my mother from
the day I was a small child. If there was something of which I would not want her
to know, then don't do it, Pretty simple.
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Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the impression that Justice
Brennan's fears may have been excessive. To all appearances,
the courts have not had to bear an intolerable burden policing
the distinction between protected and unprotected sexually ori-
ented speech, 75 and yet there has been no wave of repression of
such speech.76 In fact, what is now readily available on MTV,
late-night cable television and at the local video store makes
many of the controversial works of an earlier day seem tame by
comparison. There has, of course, been much recent controversy
about 2 Live Crew, the Mapplethorpe photographs and funding
for the National Endowment for the Arts." But the apparent
resolution of these matters seems to belie any suggestion that
the roof is about to fall in on sexually oriented expression.7
What does that say about Chief Justice Burger's approach,
as adopted by the Court in Miller? The stated goal was not to
suppress sexually oriented expression but to give communities
greater discretion to evaluate such works under their own local
standards. If those communities have turned out to be more tol-
erant than Chief Justice Burger anticipated, that may only
prove that his approach is working.
I find it hard to believe, however, that the former Chief Jus-
tice sees much cause for celebration. It was not for want of try-
ing that Miller failed to halt the proliferation of pornography.
Its reformulation of the obscenity standard was simply over-
Applying that standard I would think that I wouldn't get any quarrel out of any-
one in this room, that they wouldn't want their mothers sitting next to them while
they looked at either one of those movies. They are patently offensive.
Id. at 965-66.
75. See Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973), where he said "the [Miller] reformulation must fail because it still leaves
in this Court the responsibility of determining in each case whether the materials are
protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 100-01.
76. See Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973), where he said the Miller test "will likely have the effect, whether or not
intended, of permitting far more sweeping suppression of sexually oriented expression,
including expression that would almost certainly be held protected under our current
formulation." Id. at 96.
77. See, e.g., Note, "As Nasty As They Wanna Be". Popular Music on Trial, 65
N.Y.U.,. REv. 1481, 1501-04 (1990); RoSEN, supra note 18.
78. See Congress Approves Arts Funding Compromise, WASH. PosT, Oct. 28, 1990,
at A.17; Rap Group Found Not Guilty in Obscenity Case, N.Y. TrmEs, Oct. 21, 1990, at
25, col. 1; Cincinnati Jury Acquits Museum in Mapplethorpe Obscenity Case, N.Y.
TmEs, Oct. 6, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
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taken by events over which the Supreme Court had no control,
including the development of new technology (notably the VCR)
that could turn every living room in the land into a blue movie
house. Miller gave prosecutors and juries more discretion, but
they have shown relatively little interest in exploiting it. Even
though a majority of the Supreme Court was not willing to
adopt Justice Brennan's "consenting adults" rationale, that, im-
plicitly at least, is what much of the country has evidently done.
Moreover, it is not even clear that the Supreme Court has
really solved the institutional problems about which Justice
Brennan warned. In several recent opinions Justice Scalia has
called for reconsideration of Miller.7 e He has said that the courts
should stop trying to distinguish between sex and obscenity, or
otherwise adjudicate questions of taste, and should focus instead
on the commercial activities involved in distributing sexually
oriented materials. Under his view, the states could not suppress
a work of art or even of pornography, but they could regulate or
even suppress the business of pornography.80 Justice Scalia
comes at the problem of obscenity from a perspective very dif-
ferent from Justice Brennan's, but he is apparently concerned
about a very similar problem.
In the final analysis, whether one agrees or disagrees with
Justice Brennan's conclusions on obscenity, it must be conceded
that his obscenity opinions abundantly demonstrate the remark-
able qualities he brought to the task of serving as a Justice of
the Supreme Court.
When he thought he was wrong, he was prepared to admit
it. Although he had set the course for the Court in this area for
16 years, he did not hesitate to change direction when he be-
came convinced the course was unsound.
He was not an absolutist or an ideologue. Some of his ad-
mirers and detractors have suggested that he brought to consti-
tutional analysis a kind of unified field theory in which every
piece was made to fit a larger framework. The evidence of his
obscenity opinions is, at least to my mind, to the contrary. They
make clear that he decided cases one at a time and was more
79. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); FW/PBS,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596, 617 (1990) (separate opinion of Scalia, J.).
80. FWIPBS, Inc., 110 S. Ct. at 623-24.
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concerned about making sense out of the particular issues
presented than of building an overarching analytic superstruc-
ture. He would not accept the absolutist position of Justices
Black and Douglas because he believed it left the states too little
room to pursue substantial and legitimate interests in regulating
the distribution of sexually oriented materials to juveniles and
unconsenting adults. He accepted the legitimacy and importance
of state concerns about child pornography. In one opinion he
called the coercive enlistment of children in the making of ob-
scenity "a grave and widespread evil which the states are amply
justified in seeking to eradicate."' He also concurred in the
judgment of the Court in New York v. Ferber,82 which upheld a
state statute designed to curb child pornography.
He was not afraid of unpopular causes. He concluded his
last obscenity opinion - a dissent, naturally, in Osborne v.
Ohio"3 - with this observation:
When speech is eloquent and the ideas expressed lofty, it is easy
to find restrictions on them invalid. But were the First Amend-
ment limited to such discourse, our freedom would be sterile in-
deed. Mr. Osborn's pictures may be distasteful, but the Constitu-
tion guarantees both his right to possess them privately and his
right to avoid punishment under an overbroad law.8
He was deeply concerned about process. From the beginning
he worried as much about the procedures for determining
whether a work was obscene as he did about the substantive
standards to be applied. At the core of his concern in Paris
Adult Theater was his conviction that the Court had failed to
discharge one of its most fundamental obligations - to articu-
late intelligible grounds for its decisions that could guide the
81. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 592 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The statute prohibited the knowing promotion of a sexual
performance by a child under the age of 16 through the distribution of material depict-
ing such a performance. Citing his own opinion for the court in Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968), Justice Brennan said the state's interest in protecting its youth, and
the vulnerability of children, give it leeway to regulate pornographic material, the pro-
motion of which is harmful to children, even though it does not have the same leeway
when it seeks only to protect consenting adults from exposure to such material. Ferber,
458 U.S. at 776.
83. 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
84. Id. at 1695.
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process of adjudication in the state and federal courts.
Finally, and contrary to what many of his critics have said,
he was determined to subordinate his own value preferences to
the principles he discerned in the Constitution. From the stand-
point of personal values, it is hard to imagine a more improbable
defender of sexually oriented expression. I have no doubt that
the exhibits in these cases would have been totally repellent to
him, had he even been willing to look at them. He simply did
not believe that his own taste had anything to do with the con-
stitutional' questions presented.
Although in recent years Justice Brennan was usually in
dissent in cases involving sexually oriented expression, his de-
.parture from the Court has already made a difference in this
area. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Court held that Indi-
ana could constitutionally prohibit nude, non-obscene dancing
under a public decency statute.85 Had Justice Brennan still been
on the Court, he would almost certainly have joined with Jus-
tices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, who dissented
from the decision in Barnes, and provided a fifth vote to hold
that nude dancing is constitutionally protected under the first
amendment.
Which way the Court will eventually turn on the problem of
obscenity is obviously impossible to predict. It may yet adopt
the consenting adults rationale that Justice Brennan champi-
oned for so many years. But it need not do so to validate what
he accomplished in this area. Over the course of 34 years, from
Roth to Osborne v. Ohio, more than any other single justice, he
defined and pressed the issues and dominated the debate. Of
course, what makes this achievement all the more remarkable is
that this was but one of so may different areas in which he made
as indelible a mark.
85. 59 U.S.L.W. 4745 (1991).
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